South America

  • HAITI: ‘The international community has never addressed the root causes of the crisis’

    NixonBoumbaCIVICUS speaks with Nixon Boumba, a human rights activist and member of Kolektif Jistis Min nan Ayiti (Haiti Justice in Mining Collective), about the political situation in Haiti following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Formed in 2012, Haiti Justice in Mining Collective is a movement of Haitian civil society organisations, individuals and partners pushing for transparency and social and environmental justice in the face of growing international interest in Haiti’s mining sector. It educates affected communities on the consequences of mining in five areas: the environment, water, work, agriculture and land.
  • Joint Statement: Dozens killed in Nicaragua by state repression of protests

    Spanish

    We hereby condemn the violent repression of the demonstrations held in Nicaragua against the Social Security reforms, and we demand respect for the legitimate right to protest of Nicaraguan women and men

    Daniel Ortega, President of the Republic of Nicaragua.

    Rosario Murillo, Vice President of the Republic of Nicaragua.

    We, 323 undersigned national, diverse regional and international organizations and networks, hereby condemn the violent repression of the demonstrations held in Nicaragua against the Social Security reforms, and we demand respect for the legitimate right to protest of Nicaraguan women and men.

    Since Wednesday the 18th April, organizations, networks and human rights defenders in Nicaragua have been documenting and denouncing multiple violations of the right to hold peaceful protests, that include: murders, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, physical aggressions; the use of stones, sticks, rubber bullets, and tear gas; threats, acts of intimidation and the infringement of the right to information; in the context of the demonstrations that were organised in response to the Government’s imposition of the Social Security reforms that involve cuts of 5% in pensions, as well as other measures that affect the fundamental rights of Nicaraguan women and men.

    As has been verified, these attacks are being perpetrated by State security forces that repress the population with excessive use of force, and by groups of civilians linked to the Juventud Sandinista (Sandinista Youth Movement) who are acting with total impunity, and with the complicity and consent of the police, causing outbreaks of violence that have already claimed the lives of at least 40 people.1

    Another matter of grave concern are the violations of the right to freedom of expression, manifested in the theft of journalists' professional equipment, assaults and acts of intimidation during repressive actions and the shutting down of the transmission, through digital cable service, of 100% Noticias, channel 12 and channel 23 that were covering the protests.

    These attacks violate the right to freedom of assembly and to peaceful association, the right to freedom of opinion and expression of the Nicaraguan people, and their right to defend the social rights that are threatened by the Social Security reforms that the Government seeks to impose.

    This situation is not an isolated case; in recent times, numerous acts have been documented that infringe the right to social protest - by restricting people’s freedom of movement, through campaigns of criminalization, threats and harassment against organizations and human rights’ defenders, or through the closure of communication spaces, and many other actions that threaten democracy and the human rights of Nicaraguan women and men.

    In the light of the above, we, the organizations and individual signatories to this letter, demand the following actions from the Nicaraguan State:

    • The immediate cease of repression and violence carried out by armed forces, the police and groups of civilians linked to the government. The authorities must fulfil their duty to guarantee Nicaraguan women’s and men’s right to social protest
    • The release of detainees in different parts of the country. Guarantees must be provided that no criminal action will be taken against them.
    • An inclusive national dialogue process, securing the participation and involvement of different sectors that have movilized, victims, networks and civil society organizations, as well as representatives from diverse social movements
    • Respect for the work carried out by human rights defenders, journalists and the media.

    Sincerely yours,

    1. Abogadas y Abogados para la Justicia y los Derechos Humanos

    2. Abriendo Camino A.C.

    3. Académicas en Acción Critica

    4. Acción Solidaria

    5. ACCSI Acción Ciudadana Contra el SIDA

    6. Agrupación Ciudadana por la Despenalización del aborto - El Salvador

    7. AIETI Asociacion de Investigación y Especialización sobrecTemas Iberoamericanos

    8. Aireana, grupo por los derechos de las lesbianas. Asunción. PARAGUAY

    9. Akahata A.C.

    10. Alianza Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Juventudes

    11. Alianza Regional por la Libre Expresión e Información

    12. American Jewish World Service

    13. Americas Program, Center for International Policy

    14. Amigas en Consejos de Desarrollo AMICODE

    15. AMUMRA - Asociación Civil de Derechos Humanos Mujeres Unidas Migrantes y Refugiadas en Argentina

    16. ANC- Peru

    17. Andrea Kraybill Art

    18. APADEIM

    19. APRODEH

    20. Arte para Sanar

    21. Articulação de Mulheres Brasileiras

    22. Asamblea Feminista de Madrid

    23. Asistencia Legal por Derechos Humanos A.C.

    24. Asociación Andaluza por la Solidaridad y la Paz (ASPA)

    25. Asociación Bolivarianos Diversos

    26. Asociación Cepres

    27. Asociación Ciudadana ACCEDER

    28. Asociación Ciudadana por los Derechos Humanos de Argentina

    29. Asociacion Civil De Mujeres Resilientes

    30. Asociación Civil Magdalenas Puerto Madryn

    31. Asociacion de Mujeres Salvadoreñas en Accion del Barrio San Jacinto AMSAB-SJ

    32. Asociación de jóvenes feministas Ameyalli, El Salvador

    33. Asociación Educativa Barbiana

    34. Asociación Entre Amigos LGBTI de El Salvador

    35. Asociación Interamericana para la Defensa del Ambiente, AIDA (Regional)

    36. Asociacion Interpueblos-Cantabria-España

    37. Asociación para una sociedad más justa

    38. Asociación para una vida mejor (Apuvimeh)

    39. Asociación Paz y Esperanza

    40. ASOCIACIÓN PRO DEFENSA DE LA CUENCA DEL RÍO JUAN DÍAZ

    41. Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de España

    42. Associação brasileira de defesa da mulher da infância e da juventude

    43. ATTAC Roanne

    44. AvanzaFem AC

    45. Balance Promoción para el Desarrollo y Juventud, México

    46. Beso Diverso

    47. Bilboko Bilgune Feminista

    48. BILGUNE FEMINISTA (Euskal Herria-Pais Vasco)

    49. Bordamos Feminicidios (México)

    50. Both ENDS

    51. Brigada UNE

    52. Calala Fondo de Mujeres

    53. Campaña 28 de Septiembre - Guatemala

    54. Campaña Convención DSYDR Peru

    55. Campo A.C.

    56. Canas Dignas

    57. Capital Humano y Social Alternativo - CHS Alternativo

    58. CASACIDN

    59. Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir - España

    60. Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir – México

    61. CENDEROS

    62. Centro de Acción y Defensa por los Derechos Humanos - Cadef

    63. Centro de análisis, formación e iniciativa social, CAFIS A.C.

    64. Centro de Derechos de Mujeres CDM

    65. Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Montaña Tlachinollan

    66. Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (CDH-UCAB)

    67. Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Metropolitana (CDH-UNIMET)

    68. Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Francisco de Vitoria OP, A.C. (México)

    69. Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Matías de Córdova (Chiapas, México)

    70. Centro de Documentación en Derechos Humanos "Segundo Montes Mozo S.J." (CSMM)

    71. Centro de Estudios e Investigación sobre Mujeres

    72. CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS HUMANISTAS - Costa Rica

    73. Centro de estudios y capacitación familiar. Cefa

    74. Centro de Iniciativas para la Cooperación Batá (CIC Batá)

    75. Centro de Investigación para la Prevención de la Violencia en Centroamérica – CIPREVICA

    76. Centro de Investigaciones para la Equidad Política Pública y Desarrollo, CIPE.

    77. Centro de Sanación, Formación e Investigación Transpersonal Q'anil

    78. Centro Documentación e Información Bolivia-CEDIB-

    79. Centro Hermanas Mirabal de Derechos Humanos A.C.

    80. Centro Para el Desarrollo Integral de la Mujer

    81. Centro para la Paz y los DDHH de la Universidad Central de Venezuela

    82. Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional (CEJIL)

    83. Cepaz - Centro de Justicia y Paz

    84. CEPROSAF

    85. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

    86. Civilis Derechos Humanos

    87. CLADEM ARGENTINA (Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de las Mujeres)

    88. CLADEM Bolivia

    89. Cladem Nicaragua

    90. Coalicion Todas

    91. Codhez

    92. Codice, Jalisco

    93. Colectiva Actoras de Cambio

    94. Colectiva Amorales

    95. Colectiva Ciudad y Género AC

    96. Colectiva con Letra F (México)

    97. Colectiva Chancha Negra

    98. Colectiva de Mujeres de Masaya

    99. Colectiva Femimista

    100. Colectiva Sororidad Glocal

    101. Colectivas lesbicas

    102. Colectivo de Abogados "José Alvear Restrepo" (Ccajar), Colombia

    103. Colectivo de Mujeres de Matagalpa Nicaragua

    104. Colectivo de Mujeres Sobrevivientes Siempre Resistentes – Chile

    105. Colectivo de Trabajadoras y Trabajadores Sociales de Honduras (CTS-H)

    106. Colectivo de Trabajadores y Trabajadoras de Honduras

    107. Colectivo Estudiantil Pro Derechos Humanos del Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas

    108. Colectivo Josefa Lastiri

    109. Colectivo para la Participación de la Infancia y Juventud

    110. Colectivo PSG

    111. Colectivo Trans del Uruguay

    112. Colectivo Utopía Puebla

    113. Collectif Guatemala

    114. Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Ica

    115. Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos del Estado Monagas de la Federación de Colegios de Abogados de Venezuela

    116. Comité Ambiental en Defensa de la Vida (Colombia).

    117. Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de las Mujeres (CLADEM)

    118. Comité de America Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres (CLADEM- Mexico)

    119. Comité por los derechos humanos en América latina (CDHAL)

    120. Comunidad de familiares y amigos por los Derechos Humanos de la Diversidad Sexual COFADHIS

    121.Comunidad Xinka

    122.Concertación Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres

    123.Consejo de Mujeres Cristianas

    124. Consejo tiyat tlali

    125. Consorcio para el Diálogo Parlamentario MX

    126. Consorcio para el Diálogo Parlamentario y la Equidad Oaxaca AC

    127. ControlaTuGobierno, A.C.

    128. CONVERGENCIA DE LAS CULTURAS - Costa Rica

    129. Convite A.C.

    130. Cooperacció

    131. Coordinación de Mujeres del Paraguay

    132. Coordinadora 28 de Mayo - Guatemala

    133. Coordinadora Estatal de Organizaciones Feministas

    134. Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos - Perú

    135. Coordinadora Norte Tierra y Libertad - Costa Rica

    136. Córdoba Solidaria

    137. Count Me In! Consortium

    138. Cuerpas Creando Comunidad

    139. Cuerpas Sin Reglas

    140. CuidaTuEspcio 

    141. Defiende Venezuela

    142. Derechos Humanos

    143. Ditsö- Costa Rica

    144. Ecologistas en Acción (España)

    145. Elige Red de Jóvenes por los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos AC

    146. Ellas por la igualdad AC

    147. Epistemologías del Sur: Red de pensamiento crítico, respecto de los derechos humanos, la dinámica educativa y el territorio

    148. Equidad de Género, Ciudadanía, Trabajo y Familia

    149. Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación de la Compañía de Jesús en Honduras

    150. Escritorio Juridico Gutierrez Ceballos

    151. Espacio DESCA

    152. Espacio Público - Venezuela

    153. Espiral hacia la Igualdad

    154. Estancia del Migrante González y Martínez, A.C. (Querétaro, México)

    155. Estudiantes por una Política Sensata de Drogas, Costa Rica.

    156. EXCUBITUS derechos humanos en educacion.

    157. Existir al caminar A.C.

    158. Feministas en Marcha - Puerto Rico

    159. Feministas Independientes

    160. FIA capitulo Venezuela Seccional Anzoategui

    161. Fondo Apthapi Jopueti Bolivia

    162. Fondo CAMY

    163. Fondo de Acción Urgente para América Latina y el Caribe FAU-AL

    164. FONDO LUNARIA MUJER COLOMBIA

    165. Foro de Jóvenes con Liderazgo AC

    166. Free Press Unlimited

    167. FRENTE COOPERATIVO Y DE ECONOMÍA SOCIAL - Costa Rica

    168. Frente por los Derechos Igualitarios

    169. FRIDA | The Young Feminist Fund

    170. FRONT LINE DEFENDERS

    171. Fronteras

    172. FUNBIDE

    173. Fundación Acceso

    174. Fundación Arcoiris por el respeto a la diversidad sexual.

    175. Fundación CAUCE, Cultura Ambiental - Causa Ecologista. Paraná. Argentina

    176. Fundación Colectivo Hombres XX, A. C.

    177.  Fundacion PANIAMOR

    178.  Fundación para el Debido Proceso (DPLF)

    179. Fundacion para el Desarrollo Comunitario-FUNDECOM

    180. Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Libertad Ciudadana

    181. Fundación salvadoreña por la diversidad sexual de la Mano Contigo

    182. FUNDECOM

    183. Global Fund for Women

    184. Grupo de Accion Comunitaria. Madrid. Estado Español

    185. Grupo de Educación Popular con Mujeres A.C.

    186. Grupo Visión Nocturna Uruguay

    187. Guatemala citizen

    188. Guatemaltecas por la Defensa del Estado Laico (GDEL)

    189.Hivos

    190. Iacta Sociojuridica SCCLP

    191.ILGALAC

    192. IMDEC AC

    193. INCIDIR, A.C.

    194. Ingeniería Sin Fronteras Aragón

    195. Iniciativas de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo

    196. Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights

    197. Instituto Caribeño de Derechos Humanos (ICADH)

    198. Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible

    199. Instituto Sur Andino de Investigación y Acción Solidaria-ISAIAS

    200. IRC WASH

    201. JAKILU

    202. JASS-JUST ASSOCIATES/ASOCIADAS POR LO JUSTO

    203. Jóvenes Voceras y Voceros en DSDR, El Salvador.

    204. Juntos por la Vida

    205. Justice and Peace Netherlands 206.Kallpachay Suyu. Ambiente y cultura.

    207. Kentucky Interfaith Taskforce on Latin America and the Caribbean

    208. La Cabaretiza AC

    209. La Casa Mandarina AC

    210. LA COMUNIDAD PARA EL DESARROLLO HUMANO - Costa Rica

    211. Laboratorio de la Máscara

    212. Las Reinas Chulas cabaret y derechos humanos A.C.

    213.Lesbocolectivo las Resueltas

    214. LeSVOZ, AC

    215. Los siempre sospechosos de todo

    216. Mama Cash

    217. Maquila Solidarity Network

    218. MARCHA CENTROAMERICANA POR LA PAZ Y LA NO VIOLENCIA

    219. Margens Clínicas - São Paulo/ Brasil

    220. Marxa Mundial de Dones

    221. Memoria de mujeres

    222. Momundh

    223. Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres de Nicaragua

    224. Movimiento de Mujeres de Chinandega

    225. Movimiento de Mujeres de Santo Tomás

    226. Movimiento de Mujeres Visitación Padilla

    227. Movimiento Migrante Mesoamericano

    228. Movimiento Vinotinto

    229. Mujer Ideas Desarrollo e Investigación

    230. Mujer y salud en Uruguay MYSU

    231. Mujeres Ambientalistas, El Salvador.

    232. Mujeres de Izabal

    233. Mujeres de Negro Rosario – Argentina

    234. Mujeres Integradas en el Oeste de Rosario Argentina

    235.Mujeres Trabajadoras Unidas, A.C

    236. MUNDO SIN GUERRAS Y SIN VIOLENCIA - Costa Rica

    237. Ni Una Menos

    238. NIMD

    239. Observatorio Etico Caribe y América Central – Obetica

    240. Observatorio Ético Internacional – OBETI

    241. Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social (OVCS)

    242. ODASA

    243. OFICINA JURIDICA PARA LA MUJER

    244. OMCT - Organización Mundial Contra la Tortura

    245. Organización de Mujeres Tierra Viva

    246. OTRANS ARGENTINA

    247. Otros Mundos A.C./Amigos de la Tierra México

    248. Paro Internaciónal se Mujeres, Polonia

    249. Partido Feminista de España

    250. PARTIDO HUMANISTA - Costa Rica

    251. Perifèries del Món

    252. Pikara Magazine (País Vasco-España)

    253. Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo PIDHDD

    254. Plataforma Internacional contra la Impunidad

    255. Plataforma Salvadoreña de juventudes

    256. Plazandreok

    257. Please remove signature of Kentucky Interfaith Taskforce

    258. Presencia y Palabra: Mujeres Afroperuanas

    259. Pro-Búsqueda

    260. Profesionales católicos - Piura - Perú

    261. Proiuris

    262. PROMEDEHUM (Venezuela)

    263. Radio Stereo Vos

    264.Radioexpresion

    265. Reacción Climática - Bolivia

    266. Red Con Las Amigas Y En La Casa

    267. Red de Activistas Ciudadanos por los DDHH

    268. Red de Ambientalistas Comunitarios de El Salvador RACDES

    269. Red de la No Violencia contra las Mujeres - REDNOVI

    270. Red de mujeres contra la violencia

    271. Red de salud de las Mujeres Latinoamericanas y del Caribe

    272. Red Internacional de Migración y Desarrollo

    273. Red Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Jóvenes por los Derechos Sexuales RedLAC

    274. Red Nacional Coincidir

    275. Red Nacional de Defensoras de Derechos Humanos en Honduras

    276. Red Para la Infancia y la Adolescencia de El Salvador (RIA)

    277. Red Solidaria de Derechos Humanos A.C. (Michoacán, México)

    278. REDLAMYC Red latinoamericana y caribeña que lucha por los derechos de niñas niños y adolescentes

    279. REDMUCH

    280. Refugee and Immigrant Fund (RIF)

    281. Resonar

    282. RESURJ Realizando la Justicia Sexual

    283. Revista SIC del Centro Gumilla

    284. Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights

    285. Roma National Center from Moldova

    286. Schone Kleren Campagne

    287. Schumacher College

    288. Sector de Mujeres

    289. Seguridad en Democracia (SEDEM)

    290. Semillas de Nuestra Tierra, AC

    291. Sol de primavera

    292. Sombrilla Costa Rica

    293. SOS Corpo- Instituto Feminista para a Democracia - Recife/ Pernambuco -Brasil

    294. Spatium Libertas AC

    295. SPW

    296. St Williams church

    297. Stichting Lleca (Holanda)

    298. Strajk Kobiet Polonia

    299. SURKUNA - Centro de apoyo y protección de derechos humanos

    300. Sursiendo, Comunicación y Cultura Digital AC

    301. Swefor Guatemala

    302. Tequio jurídico

    303. Todas Mx

    304. Trabajadora del retail

    305. Transparencia Venezuela

    306. Uganda Youth Alliance For Family Planning And Adolescents Health -UYAFPAH

    307. Unidad de Protección a Defensoras y Defensores de Derechos Humanos - Guatemala (UDEFEGUA)

    308. Unidas Somos Tendencia

    309. Union global por la democracia

    310. Unión Latinoamericana de Mujeres ULAM

    311. Unitierra

    312. Universidad de la Tierra en Puebla

    313. Urgent Action Fund- Latin America and the Caribbean

    314. UXU EMAKUMEEN TALDEA

    315. Vecinas Feministas por la Justicia Sexual y Reproductiva en América Latina y el Caribe

    316. Voces de mujeres, historias que transforman

    317. Voces Mesoamericanas, Acción con Pueblos Migrantes A.C.

    318. WECF International

    319. Witness for Peace

    320. WO=MEN Dutch Gender Platform

    321. WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America)

    322. Women Advocacy and Development Initiative (WADI)

    323. Women Strike Polonia

    1 Source: Nicaraguan Initiative of Women Human Rights Defenders (IN-Defensoras)
  • New Report: Civic Space in the Americas

    People’s rights to organise, speak out and take action are being extensively violated in a large number of countries in the Americas. This is according to new research by global civil society alliance CIVICUS, the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC), the Charity and Security Network, the Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy (REDLAD) and the Rendir Cuentas initiative. Our findings are based on data from the CIVICUS Monitor, a new research collaboration to track and compare civic freedoms on a global scale.
  • PARAGUAY: ‘As long as land remains in private hands, conflict will continue '

    CIVICUS speaks with Alicia Amarilla, national coordinator of the Organisation of Peasant and Indigenous Women (CONAMURI) in Paraguay about conflicts over land rights between the state, the private sector and Indigenous communities. CONAMURI is a Paraguayan organisation of Indigenous and peasant women that has been working for 22 years to defend and promote their rights and seek solutions to situations of poverty, exclusion and discrimination based on ethnicity and gender.
  • PARAGUAY: ‘Very tough years are ahead for civil society that promotes human rights’

    MartaFerraraCIVICUS discusses Paraguay’s recent general election with Marta Ferrara, executive director of Seeds for Democracy (Semillas para la Democracia).

    Founded in 2006, Seeds for Democracy is a civil society organisation (CSO) whose main objective is to contribute to the improvement of the quality of democracy in Paraguay by promoting citizen participation, social equity and accountable governance.

    What are Paraguay’s main challenges, and to what extent could the results of the recent election contribute to solving them?

    Paraguay’s main problems are fundamentally economic, stemming from deep inequality. In recent years, Paraguay has had very good macroeconomic indicators, with high growth, but has remained very unequal, with high unemployment, large numbers of people in informal work and lack of access to health, education and opportunities. It is a country run by immensely wealthy cattle-ranching and agro-exporting elites who rule for their own benefit and to the detriment of a terribly unequal society. I believe this is the central characteristic of Paraguayan society and economy. It is a deep, structural problem, and this election has done nothing to solve it. The same people as always have won: the same sectors that have kept the country in this situation for more than 70 years.

    At stake in this election was the possibility of alternation in power. However, that would not necessarily have meant radical change, because the presidential candidate of Concertación, the opposition coalition, was also a conservative, albeit from the Liberal Party. His running mate was a woman, but he still represented a conservative sector of society. These were not disruptive candidacies representing a real change in the way politics is conducted, in the way power is exercised, in terms of public policies or representing different social sectors.

    How do you explain the comfortable win for the Colorado Party, despite the incumbent president’s very low approval rating?

    The results can be explained to a large extent by the effects, which we already anticipated, of the system of unblocked lists with preferential voting in the context of a divided opposition.

    A couple of years ago there was an electoral reform that replaced the closed and blocked party lists with unblocked lists with preferential voting. In these, the voter can select a candidate within the list of their choice, in order to vote for both a party and a candidate; then, according to the number of votes obtained by each candidate and their list, seats are distributed by the D’Hont system.

    This system was introduced in the last municipal elections and we already knew that it would have some negative effects. A big problem with unblocked lists is that generally the candidate with the most money is the one who gets ahead. They also cause strong competition of all against all within parties.

    In addition, the old system was replaced by electronic ballot boxes without sufficient training, meaning that people were not well prepared to use the new system. This allowed the spread of so-called ‘assisted voting’, which is illegal, and which basically consists of having people at polling stations interfering with voting with the excuse of helping voters use the electronic system.

    All this benefited the Colorado Party, which has been at the helm of the state for a long time and is therefore the one with the most resources, and which has sufficient internal diversity to be able to provide replacement options for those who are dissatisfied with their government they lead.

    There were, however, some small improvements in women’s representation. For the first time two women have been elected governors and there are more women than before in both houses of Congress.

    But with the opposition divided, the Colorado Party won by the widest margin in Paraguay’s democratic history. In addition to winning the presidency, it won control of both houses of Congress and 15 of 17 governorships.

    The other defining feature of this election was the emergence of a third opposition political grouping with a populist-authoritarian and messianic style. Led by Paraguayo Cubas, it represents so-called ‘angry voters’, those dissatisfied with traditional parties and the way politics has been conducted for decades. This candidacy did not take votes away from the government but from the opposition, and unexpectedly came in a close third place, with more than 20 per cent.

    What is the basis for the allegations of fraud voiced by protesters?

    The followers of Paraguayo Cubas, joined by people from practically all sectors of the opposition, many of them young people disaffected with politics, have taken to the streets en masse across the country to denounce fraud, despite the fact that their candidate got a very good vote, which they did not expect. The fact that an anti-establishment group is mobilising protests on a scale not seen in a long time represents a major challenge for the future of democracy in Paraguay.

    This was a relatively peaceful election in which there was virtually no violence. What there was plenty of was disinformation, hate speech and social media attacks throughout the campaign. These aggressions strongly affected CSOs, including our own, Seeds for Democracy, and came mostly from the ruling party and the party and supporters of Paraguayo Cubas, although Concertación also launched similar attacks against its political opponents.

    What role did civil society play during the election?

    Civil society played a relatively important role, despite the restrictions it has faced. The Electoral Court initially did not authorise civil society election observation and instead issued a rather restrictive regulation. It finally accepted that the Sakã Consortium, a civil society coalition, would carry out observation and a parallel count, but with very many restrictions.

    Seeds for Democracy has been actively involved in denouncing the problems of political financing, an issue we have succeeded in placing on the agenda. The other major problem in Paraguay, along with enormous inequality, is corruption. Lack of control over money in politics has brought groups linked to organised crime to power, both in Congress and in governors’ offices.

    We will soon be working on political finance control. In Paraguay, campaign spending is controlled after elections. A month later, when the parties submit their statements, we begin to monitor them through the Electoral Court’s Citizen Observatory of Political Financing, cross-checking data on public contracts with the sworn statements published on public agencies’ websites. Paraguay’s freedom of information legislation is quite good and enables us to do this work.

    How do you see the future of democracy in Paraguay?

    In the medium to long term I see a very difficult situation. There are many things to be resolved in order to improve the quality of democracy. The emerging political group is violent, anti-rights, fundamentalist and messianic. Its inspiration is the popular authoritarian president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, and his way of ruling, so I think we are in for some very tough years ahead.

    The section of the Colorado Party that won the election is one whose leaders attack civil society. They are anti-rights: they define themselves as ‘pro-life’, they are against equal marriage and sexual and reproductive rights and they attack all issues related to gender rights. That’s why I think civil society is in for a very tough few years. The various segments of civil society, especially those working on rights issues, are going to have to make big efforts to join together and undertake collective action.

    At the moment, some organisations have some funding from international cooperation sources, and we hope that this support will increase and strengthen so that we can work together to face all these challenges. It will be a constant struggle, all the more difficult because we have already seen attacks against freedom of expression and press freedom.

    I do not expect much in the coming months. For the time being, we must stay vigilant to understand which way things are going. But what is certain is that very tough years are ahead for CSOs that promote human rights.

    Civic space in Paraguay is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Seeds for Democracy through theirwebsite orFacebook page, and follow@semillaspy on Twitter.
  • Paraguay's Adoption of the Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights

    Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights -- Outcome Adoption for Paraguay

    Delivered by Inés M. Pousadela

    Thank you, Madame President.

    Semillas para la Democracia and CIVICUS welcome the government of Paraguay’s acceptance of UPR recommendations pertaining the space for civil society. However, our joint UPR submission documents that Paraguay did not implement 13 of the 19 such recommendations it received during its previous review, and only partially implemented six.

    As detailed in our submission, both state and non-state actors frequently attack, intimidate and judicially harass human rights defenders and journalists, particularly when reporting on protests, organised crime, corruption and human rights abuses; the hostile environment for journalists is fuelled from the highest political levels. Defenders of Indigenous and peasant communities and land rights activists are targeted in attacks often linked to agribusiness corporations; women’s and LGBTQI+ rights defenders face attacks perpetrated mostly by fundamentalist anti-rights groups. Examples abound of land rights defenders who suffered attempts on their lives, and some have been killed. Most aggressions remain unpunished.

    Workers face strong legal obstacles to exercise their freedom of association, as well as de facto obstacles and direct attacks from non-state actors, notably private companies that threaten to fire them if they try to organise. The law does not adequately protect this freedom.

    Our submission also shows that the freedom of expression is threatened by the systematic use of criminal defamation statutes by public figures to intimidate and silence critical journalists, especially when they investigate allegations of corruption. The deficient implementation of the Access to Information Law has restricted access to information that should be public, and instances of censorship as well as self-censorship have been recorded.

    The exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly remains obstructed. Peaceful demonstrations, particularly by the peasant and Indigenous movement and communities mobilising for land rights, are frequently broken up with excessive force, typically leading to people being arrested or injured, and occasionally resulting in fatalities.

    We call on the Government of Paraguay to take proactive measures to address these concerns and implement recommendations to create and maintain, in law and in practice, an enabling environment for civil society.

    We thank you.

    Civic space in Paraguay is rated as obstructed by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  • PERU: ‘Environmental regulations were relaxed, when they should have been strengthened’

    Juan Carlos SueiroCIVICUS discusses the recent oil spill off the coast of Lima, Peru, with Juan Carlos Sueiro, Director of Fisheries at Oceana, the world’s largest international organisation dedicated to protecting and restoring the world’s oceans. Founded in 2001, Oceana focuses its work on restoring fisheries, promoting clean energy and establishing protected marine areas.

    Has anyone been held responsible for the oil spill off the coast of Lima?

    The oil spill, caused by the Spanish oil company Repsol, happened on 15 January 2022. Due to its magnitude and visibility, it was the worst ecological disaster in Peru’s recent history. It occurred in an artisanal fishing zone, with protected areas and important seasonal economic activity. It is the largest spill we have ever had.

    The spill happened because of the high tides caused by the eruption of the Tonga submarine volcano, which affected the process of unloading oil from a Repsol oil tanker to the La Pampilla refinery. The question is: how is it possible that the company only became aware of the magnitude of the spill the next day? The company’s negligence magnified the consequences of this spill.

    Unfortunately, we have seen little progress in terms of Repsol taking responsibility for recovering the ecosystem. Even the exact volume of oil spilled is not known with any certainty. The company’s reaction was very slow, which is worrying because the first 24 hours following this kind of accident are key, as the oil film becomes very thin and expands a lot. It was only almost 20 days later that more sophisticated equipment was brought in to address the problem.

    Overall there is not enough transparency. In this case, the contingency plan was not implemented. The activities currently underway are supposed to be the product of a plan, but neither the company’s commitments nor the contents of that plan have been made public. The area between Ancón and Chancay was heavily impacted on by the spill, and there is no bay there, only cliffs and water. It is visible how little has been done in the way of recovery.

    There is also little transparency in the investigation. It is still not clear whether Repsol has handed over the equipment that was underwater in order to investigate and determine what happened on the day of the spill.

    This lack of transparency is symptomatic of the way the Peruvian state operates. This is similar to what happened when the pandemic broke out and we ‘discovered’ that we had an absolutely precarious health system, which was clearly not up to the task. In this case, we have environmental structures, legislation and procedures on paper, but not in reality. The opacity of information is intended to hide this discrepancy.

    For us it is very clear: Repsol must publicly assume clearly defined responsibilities.

    What have been the environmental and economic impacts of the spill?

    There has been great environmental damage. The area affected by the spill includes several protected natural areas: the Ancón Reserved Zone, the Guaneras Islands and the Punta Salinas Reserved Zone. The spill has impacted on marine fauna, affecting animals such as sea lions, otters, penguins and birds. Many have been stained with oil and their lives are at risk. Oceana is currently surveying this damage, as well as the additional damage caused by the company’s delayed reaction.

    For communities in the area, the greatest concern is economic. These are mostly low-income people engaged in artisanal fishing. Beyond individual and immediate impacts – for example, for those who had invested in a seasonal business just before the spill – the consequences are collective and long-term. It is now impossible to fish in Ancón or Chancay, and it is difficult to know when it will be possible to do so, because oil has a much longer degradation time when it settles on the seabed. The fishermen and all the workers involved in processing and distribution logistics are also concerned about the variation in fish prices and the drop in demand.

    We have run a calculation of the economic worth of coastal fisheries in these places to give us an idea of the economic loss. We also believe that there is an important impact on tourist activity: for the nine million inhabitants of the capital, Lima, and the three million living a little further north, these beaches are the closest place to spend the summer, and the spill has cut short the summer season, which runs from January to April. We have already warned the local municipalities that they must estimate the damage caused to tourism.

    How has civil society responded?

    We have all reacted with concern and a great interest in helping others. We have seen many volunteers helping to clean up the beaches, as well as experts and academics contributing within their areas of expertise.

    However, volunteer work has limitations because in order to rescue marine wildlife from the damage caused by oil, certain procedures and products must be used to properly remove oil from an animal’s plumage or skin. Because of this, interest in helping usually does not translate into 100 per cent successful results.

    Moreover, as this is the first time we have faced a disaster of this magnitude, Peru does not have all the expertise it needs. There is post-disaster expertise and experience elsewhere; it is necessary to bring it in. It would also be important to deepen the discussion about the energy mix we have and how to change it by turning towards the renewable resources that are available to us.

    How can private companies be called to account and contribute to preventing future disasters?

    Lack of accountability is a longstanding concern for the communities in these areas, and the fact that their demands have been systematically ignored is a symptom of Peru’s strong centralism. Artisanal fishermen in the north have been warning about this situation for several years and there has been no meaningful response. Oil extraction in Peru dates back to the 19th century; Peru had the first oilwell in South America. In the 1950s and 1960s, offshore platforms were installed, which are at the root of the spills and leaks that fishers complain about. There are also complaints about what happens in the transportation process, which has much greater implications.

    This situation has encouraged civil society to prioritise the search for solutions. For almost a decade, environmental requirements have been reduced in Peru; it is necessary to walk back that path. Peru is engaged in fishing, mining and other activities for which regulations have been relaxed, when they should have been strengthened. The very low environmental capacity of the state and the poor response of companies to disasters clearly shows their inadequacy. Peru suffers from a major crisis of governance and respect for the rule of law. 

    The possibility of another spill is always present. It is necessary to minimise the likelihood of it happening, and to ensure that when it does, it has the least possible impact in terms of magnitude, frequency and consequences. To do this we have to start by not losing sight of who is responsible for this disaster and the consequences of their irresponsible action.

    Civic space in Peru is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Oceana through itswebsite or itsFacebook,Instagram andTik Tok accounts, and follow@Oceana_Peru and@SueiroJC on Twitter.
  • PERU: ‘It is necessary to restore trust in elections’

    CIVICUS speaks with Iván Lanegra, secretary general of Transparency Civil Association (Asociación Civil Transparencia), about Peru’s recent presidential elections and the state of its democracy. Transparency is an independent civil society organisation that works to improve the quality of democracy and political representation by facilitating dialogue between political, governmental and civil society actors, implementing education and capacity-building programmes for citizen and political leadership, developing public policy proposals and observing electoral processes.

    Ivan Lanegra

    What was different and what was at stake in this election?

    The recent general election was embedded in several political and social processes. First, it took place at the end of a very politically unstable five-year period, in which we had four presidents – Pedro Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Manuel Merino and Francisco Sagasti – and Congress was constitutionally dissolved. At the same time, the economy was no longer growing as much, and social discontent began to increase. In this context, corruption scandals undermined the credibility of political parties. This was compounded by the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, which fuelled greater demands for redistribution.

    As a result of all these processes, there was an atomisation of citizens’ preferences. The effects of this situation translated into high fragmentation of the vote in the parliamentary elections of January 2020 and, again, in the first round of the presidential election, held in April 2021, in which the two candidates who came out on top, and therefore went on to the second round, jointly received barely 33 per cent of the vote. There are 10 different political parties represented in our 130-seat Congress.

    In the second electoral round, the victory of Pedro Castillo, of the left-wing Perú Libre (Free Peru) party over Keiko Fujimori, of the right-wing Fuerza Popular (Popular Force), showed the importance of the demands for change and rejection of conventional politics that grew in recent years.

    However, the announcement of the official results was severely delayed, which created a climate of great uncertainty. In a context of high polarisation, there was an exponential increase in the number of appeals against the election results: normally, fewer than a dozen are filed, but on this occasion there were more than a thousand, none of which were considered well-founded. These appeals were used instrumentally: unfounded allegations of fraud were used to prolong the process as much as possible and to try to prevent the announcement of the results. While this attempt was unsuccessful, it delayed the transfer of power and increased distrust of politics and electoral institutions.

    Why did many people not vote?

    The rate of absenteeism in the first electoral round was almost 30 per cent, somewhat higher than in the 2020 legislative elections, when it reached 26 per cent; however, it dropped to less than 24 per cent in the runoff election. It is important to bear in mind that the first round of election took place when the COVID-19 pandemic was at its highest point in Peru. In other countries, such as Chile, it was not even possible to hold a vote due to the health emergency, but the elections took place normally in Peru. In fact, what is remarkable is that absenteeism wasn’t any higher.

    What role did Transparency play in relation to the electoral process?

    In the run-up to the election, as part of the #DecideBien (#ChooseWell) campaign, Transparency disseminated systematic information about the parties, their candidates and their proposals, so that citizens could assess their options. We broke down the parties’ policy programmes so that each person could learn about and compare the proposals of each candidate on the issues that interested them, and vote on the basis on that knowledge.

    In addition, we invited citizens to register with the National Transparency Volunteer Network to become election observers. From our perspective, election observation consists of monitoring, providing guidance and bearing witness to the events that take place during election day, as well as educating citizens about electoral conduct and rules.

    With this network of volunteers, Transparency observed the election process and from the outset we noted that the electoral process had been conducted normally, with only the kind of minor incidents that tend to occur in all elections, but which do not affect the results.

    In view of the unfounded allegations that were made in an attempt to discredit the process, we also worked to counter electoral disinformation. The phenomenon of disinformation on social media, particularly after the runoff election, was much stronger than in previous elections, and the electoral authorities themselves had to set up teams dedicated almost exclusively to debunking ‘fake news’. The climate of polarisation surely contributed to increasing the impact of disinformation.

    What political challenges lie ahead in the aftermath of the election?

    The main challenges are how to reduce distrust in the state, how to address dissatisfaction with democracy and how to improve political representation. Although compared to these challenges, political polarisation, which was exacerbated in the electoral context, is less of a concern, it must also be considered. While the most radicalised sectors continue to fuel polarisation, they are in the minority. They managed to polarise the election because they were able to get through to the second round despite having received a low percentage of the vote, but after the election, the majority of citizens are far from the extremes. However, it is important to bear in mind that distrust, dissatisfaction and the feeling of lack of representation are elements that those who seek to exploit polarisation can use to their advantage.

    It is necessary to restore trust in elections. To this end, we must continue to educate and inform citizens about the rules of elections, politics and democracy. We must also improve the mechanisms available to us for combatting disinformation. It is also necessary to move electoral reforms forward, in order to create incentives for the strengthening of political parties, as well as to improve the quality of political representation.

    Civic space in Peru is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Transparency Civil Association through itswebsite or itsFacebook,Instagram andTik Tok pages, and follow@actransparencia and@ilanegra on Twitter.

     
  • PERU: ‘Political and social instability has already cost dozens of lives’

    NadiaRamosCIVICUS speaks about the political crisis in Peru with Nadia Ramos, CEO of the Women’s Leadership Centre of the Americas and official spokesperson for the Hemispheric Network Somos Lideresas, two organisations that promote women’s leadership and empowerment in Peru and Latin America.
  • VENEZUELA: ‘The government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment to try to hold on to power’

    Mariano_de_Alba.pngCIVICUS speaks with Mariano de Alba, Senior Adviser at the International Crisis Group, about the recent referendum called by the Venezuelan government on the status of the Essequibo territory, disputed with neighbouring Guyana, and its possible implications for democracy in Venezuela and peace in the region.

    The International Crisis Group is an independent organisation that works to prevent wars and design policies to build a more peaceful world.

     

    Why did the Venezuelan government decide to submit the Essequibo issue to a referendum?

    The announcement of the referendum came first as a reaction by the Venezuelan government to the recent oil bidding rounds conducted by Guyana in maritime areas that Venezuela considers as pending delimitation. As the referendum was being organised, it became clear that the Venezuelan government was attaching additional value to it as a tool to test its capacity for electoral mobilisation a few months in advance of the presidential election due to take place later this year.

    In addition, by placing the dispute with Guyana on the public agenda, the Venezuelan government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment in the Venezuelan population, and most particularly among the armed forces, a key group in its strategy to retain power.

    What’s the legal value of the referendum?

    According to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Justice, Venezuela’s highest judicial body, consultative referendums, a mechanism established in the Venezuelan constitution, are not binding. This view was publicly ratified by the chief lawyer who was appointed by the government to prepare the referendum questions.

    But for political reasons, since before the referendum and particularly in view of its results, the government has insisted that it does have a binding character in order to justify a series of actions it has announced in relation to the territory in dispute. These, however, have been no more than symbolic announcements, since Venezuelan armed forces have not effectively entered the disputed territory, which has been under Guyanese administration for many, many years.

    How did the opposition react to the referendum, and how will this impact on the 2024 elections?

    There were differences among various opposition groups on how to position themselves in relation to the referendum. First of all, it should be noted that on 17 October, when the government and the opposition met in Barbados to sign an agreement on the conditions to hold elections, they also signed another agreement in which they committed themselves to ‘ratify the historical rights’ of Venezuela and to ‘uphold the full validity of the 1966 Geneva Agreement’, the treaty that reignited the dispute, in which Guyana, Venezuela and the UK agreed to seek a solution to the conflict. As a result, at least part of the opposition leadership found it difficult to oppose the referendum.

    However, María Corina Machado, the main opposition leader, elected as a unity candidate in primaries held in late October 2023, did criticise the referendum, arguing that ‘sovereignty must be exercised, submitted to consultation’. The most important difference within the opposition is that some opposition leaders believe that one should participate in all electoral processes, regardless of the conditions, while others do not. Some voted in the referendum, while others didn’t.

    Ahead of the presidential elections, a key element of the government’s strategy is to foster division among the opposition, so that one part ends up calling for non-participation due to lack of sufficient guarantees and another part decides to participate. In the face of a divided opposition the government has a real chance of winning the election, since under the current electoral system whoever gets the most votes, even if short of 50 per cent, is elected. The election will take place in an authoritarian context in which the conditions for the competition will be poor and there is a high risk of government repression.

    What has been Guyana’s reaction?

    Guyana is focused on seeking a favourable decision at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where in 2018 it filed a lawsuit seeking ratification of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award that gave it the territory it now controls and administers, and which Venezuela ignores, arguing that the award was the product of procedural fraud.

    However, recent tensions complicate the picture for Guyana. First, because, at least on paper, the Venezuelan armed forces have substantially superior capabilities compared to Guyana’s. Hence Guyana’s intention to seek to strengthen its military alliances and obtain guarantees from allied states. Second, the uncertainty resulting from these tensions could affect the remarkable recent economic growth of Guyana, a country with a small population but high income due to the recent discovery and exploitation of oil resources. Already in mid-December 2023, London’s Lloyd’s insurance market rated the Guyanese exclusive economic zone as risky, which could increase the cost of shipping oil from there.

    What are the risks of an escalation into armed conflict?

    The referendum has substantially increased tensions between Guyana and Venezuela. Guyana saw the referendum and the subsequent actions of the Venezuelan government as a threat. But Guyana has also taken advantage of the tensions to try to strengthen its diplomatic and military alliances with states such as the UK and the USA.

    In the short to medium term, the risk of these tensions escalating into armed conflict is low, partly because the international reaction would be so critical of it. Moreover, while the Venezuelan government has announced and gone through with actions such as appointing an authority for the territory in dispute, it has been careful to ensure that the implementation of these actions has remained on Venezuelan territory for the time being.

    But escalation is not out of the question. Tension could lead to a limited confrontation, following which it could become difficult for one or both of the countries to de-escalate.

    From the Venezuelan perspective, escalation is a risky gamble because it could generate greater discontent among the Venezuelan armed forces, which would have to risk their lives, particularly if Guyana receives the support of a key ally such as the USA. Moreover, the Venezuelan government is striving to reintegrate itself into the international community, and initiating a conflict with Guyana would derail those efforts.

    On the Guyanese side, it is uncertain whether military support would actually come in the event of a substantial military conflict. Such a conflict could also make it very risky for some companies operating in Guyana to continue doing business there. Therefore, at least in the short and medium term, barring any surprises, attempts to keep tensions on the public agenda will predominate, but without resulting in any real escalation.

    At the end of the day, both countries, as the neighbours they are, will be obliged to try to negotiate. Even if Guyana obtains a favourable ICJ decision, that will hardly be the end of it, as without Venezuela’s cooperation it will be very difficult to enforce the judgment. Moreover, the maritime area will still be pending delimitation, so sooner or later negotiations will have to take place in any case.

    What is the status of diplomatic negotiations?

    Serious diplomatic efforts have been undertaken by various countries to try to convince both governments of the importance of lowering tensions and avoiding armed conflict. These efforts resulted in an agreement signed in St Vincent and the Grenadines on 14 December. There, it was agreed to de-escalate tensions and hold a new meeting in Brazil before the end of March.

    However, distrust between the two governments remains deep. The visit of a British warship to Guyana in late December, which Venezuela interpreted as a threat to which it responded by conducting military exercises on its territory, did not help a bit.

    The outlook is complicated by the fact that both governments believe they can make political gains out of these tensions, Venezuela for predominantly domestic political reasons, and Guyana first and foremost to strengthen its military alliances, and secondarily because, if it manages the situation well, the ruling party’s prospects could improve ahead of elections in 2025.

    Behind the scenes, diplomatic efforts continue because in the face of the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, the idea prevails that there is no international space for another armed conflict, and even less so in Latin America and the Caribbean, which for so many years has been a zone of peace, at least as far as inter-state conflicts are concerned.

    Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with the International Crisis Group through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram accounts, and follow@CrisisGroup and@marianodealba on Twitter.
  • VENEZUELA: ‘We need a multilateral, flexible and creative approach from the international community’

    CIVICUS speaks with Feliciano Reyna, founder and president of Acción Solidaria, a Venezuelan civil society organisation (CSO) established in 1995 with the mission to contribute to reducing the social impact of the HIV epidemic. As a result of the multiple crises facing Venezuela, Acción Solidaria has expanded its scope of action and provides medicines and medical supplies to wider vulnerable populations.

    Feliciano Reyna

    How has the current crisis come about in Venezuela?

    A process of dismantling the rule of law has taken place over several years and is still ongoing. The judiciary has long ceased to be independent and now operates according to the interests of the government. Added to this is a high level of corruption. Many documents and reports, such as a recent one by the United Nations (UN) Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, describe how a non-independent justice structure was put in place, taking advantage of the opacity of public data and discretionary state management.

    As a result, many people, acting in their own interest, destroyed the economic and productive apparatus. Nowadays the Venezuelan economy is 20 per cent of the size it was in 2013. This has impacted on poverty levels, the quality of public services and the resulting lack of protection.

    An initial period of enormous income, lasting many years, allowed for a great waste of wealth, with resources reaching the major groups that supported Hugo Chávez’s government, from 2005 to 2013. But money was just spent on individual benefits, not invested in public services. Thus, little by little, the public sector was left in a state of total abandonment: hospitals, roads, lighting, electrical system, water distribution. Everything is pretty much destroyed. There are about four million people who cook with firewood or charcoal because they don’t receive gas. Where I live, we get water once a week for 24 hours, and sometimes we don’t get water for two or three weeks.

    There was a major shift in the global economy, with a sharp drop in oil prices coinciding with Chávez’s last days in office. When Nicolás Maduro took power in 2013, the fragility of a regime largely based on Chávez’s personality was exposed. Maduro’s victory triggered political protests because his mandate was questioned, and very harsh repressive practices were adopted in response. The situation has deteriorated ever since, leading to the current human rights crisis. CSOs have documented arbitrary detentions, torture and cruel treatment under detention. There has been a sustained attack on dissent and political opponents. Anyone in a position of power who is viewed as a political threat is taken out of play.

    The years between 2014 and 2016 were terrible. In addition to human rights violations, there was widespread harm caused to the population in terms of health, nutrition, access to water, education and other rights. As the economy deteriorated, there began to be many social protests, not for political reasons but regarding income, lack of resources, power cuts, lack of transportation and public services, and so on. With two major exceptions – the 2017 and 2019 protest waves, in which people expressed political grievances – the vast majority of protests have been social protests, not ideological ones, through which many people who ultimately supported and voted for the government expressed their discontent.

    While the attack on opposition and dissent has driven many into exile, economic shortages have led to a massive emigration wave. More than four million Venezuelans have emigrated, including many professionals, teachers and doctors, further weakening service delivery systems.

    What is the context in which civil society works?

    There state has been greatly weakened and is unable to control all the territory under its jurisdiction, so it has handed over control to other groups. Power is increasingly in the hands of local parastate actors who enjoy small bubbles of well-being within the context of immense poverty in which the vast majority of the population lives.

    Because of the weakening of the state and the deterioration of the oil industry, which has always been the main source of national income, the government has opened some spaces for a freer economy. That means that in order to serve the populations we work with, we have been able to import medicines and supplies thanks to international cooperation. Our international donors send us supplies or pay for transportation so that we can receive them, using a door-to-door delivery system.

    Since 2017 Acción Solidaria has brought in almost 240 tons of aid. We have grown from nine staff in 2016 to 40 in 2021. Every week about 120 people come to the offices of Acción Solidaria to seek medicine. Most of them are women and people with very little resources, over 55 years old. The things they need may be available in the parallel economy, but at prices they can’t afford.

    But the environment for civil society remains a high-risk one. Last year we experienced a raid by the Special Action Forces, the most fearsome command of the Bolivarian National Police. What they did to us was not an official operation but a criminal action. CSOs doing human rights advocacy are criminalised, and CSOs conducting humanitarian action face serious problems of access and are subject to extortion by these autonomised groups and paramilitary actors. We have become targets not because we are opponents or dissidents, but because we have coveted resources.

    One colleague of ours was imprisoned 160 days ago and five comrades from an organisation that works alongside the UN Refugee Agency were imprisoned for a month in a military facility.

    As the electoral process was underway, the government’s information networks among the population seemed to have become aware that government programmes – which transfer the equivalent of about US$4 a month to their beneficiaries – could not compete with the nearly US$60 that humanitarian organisations were transferring to people in their target populations, without demanding anything in return, simply as part of the humanitarian response. So they immediately stepped in and suspended the 38 humanitarian aid programmes that were making cash transfers.

    Following the elections, the transfer ecosystem has started to begin again, but so far only transfers from the Food and Agriculture Organization and UNICEF have been reactivated.

    How much popular support does the Maduro government have left? Did it have enough to win the November regional elections, or did it resort to fraud?

    In November 2021, regional elections were held to renew all executive and legislative seats in the country’s 23 federal entities and 335 municipalities. The official turnout was just over 40 per cent, and the government won 19 governorships, compared to four won by the opposition. The government also won 213 mayorships, but various opposition groups won 121, a not insignificant number.

    The conditions of electoral competition were set up well before the selection of candidates, the campaigns and the voting took place, as new members to the National Electoral Council (CNE) were appointed. The CSO Foro Cívico had proposed names of independent candidates for the CNE: people with a strong electoral background who could build a bridge of dialogue with the people in government who wanted a less authoritarian rule. This resulted in a more balanced CNE, with one independent rector and one from the opposition among the five full members, and three out of five alternates proposed by civil society. This allowed us to expect an election with greater legitimacy than previous ones.

    The electoral process was very tense. While there was no fraud in the sense that voting figures were changed, there was a lot of pressure and obstacles to prevent opposition supporters from voting. Leading opposition politicians were disqualified and unable to stand as candidates. The conditions in voting centres, including schedules, were altered for the government’s benefit, and many people were brought out to vote, despite the fact that the government no longer has the same mobilisation capacity as in previous elections. Turnout was low for several reasons: because millions of people have emigrated, and because many popular opposition figures were not taking part in the election.

    The opposition also bore a great deal of responsibility for this, because it viewed the elections with a lot of suspicion. Many of its key spokespeople were opposed to participating, and it did not reach the kind of broad agreements that would have allowed it to win as many as 10 or 12 governorships. In part, its growth was limited not just by the obstacles imposed by the government, but also by its own inability to reach an agreement.

    Still, it is important to emphasise that the playing field was not level. The opposition could have won more governorships than it did, but there was a clear limit to this. This was seen in Hugo Chávez’s home state of Barinas, which the government could not afford to lose to the opposition. An opposition candidate clearly won there, so after the fact the Supreme Court ruled that the winning candidate did not actually meet the conditions to be eligible to compete, and ordered a rerun.

    Faced with these limitations, which were foreseeable, there was a part of the opposition that from the beginning opposed participating in the elections and left the way open for many pro-government victories that might not otherwise have taken place.

    How consolidated is the Maduro regime, and what are the chances that a democratic transition can take place?

    A democratic transition does not seem to be an option in the short term. The opposition is very diverse and is dispersed both programmatically and in terms of its institutional approach, so it is questionable whether it would be able to govern if it had the opportunity right now.

    What lies ahead of us is a long trek through the desert. The government suffers from many weaknesses, but it has the support of China, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and a lot of political support from Cuba and other countries in the region, as is apparent in the UN Human Rights Council. Maduro’s government has adopted a deft approach in the image of these supportive states: despite corruption and lack of transparency, it has allowed an opening in the economy while keeping its repressive behaviour intact.

    The international support that the government receives is important and has been systematically underestimated, while the support received by the interim government led by Juan Guaidó has been overestimated. It has been said that he has the USA and 60 other countries on his side, but those who support him with real actions are in fact much fewer.

    For many in the opposition, the interim government has itself been a big problem, partly because it became associated with the Donald Trump administration, and partly because since the interim government was established what it did became the only thing that mattered, and the space of the National Assembly, which had enjoyed broad popular support, was abandoned.

    The interim government was prompted on the basis of Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution. Since by virtue of his fraudulent re-election in 2018 Maduro was not recognised by the opposition as a legitimate president, the opposition-dominated National Assembly proclaimed its president, who at the time was Juan Guaidó, as interim president of Venezuela. I think that the opposition should have continued to work through the National Assembly, an elected and legitimate body whose presidency alternated between the parties with the most votes. Evidence of corruption could have been collected and mechanisms sought to protect the country’s assets with the help of the international community.

    Instead, the opposition named itself as a legitimate government without having any control over internal processes. And when it took over, it set out expedited conditions and deadlines, demanding that Maduro should first leave office so that the interim government could constitute itself as a transitional government and organise free elections.

    The choice of the opposition to proclaim an interim government was the result of it underestimating the government’s forces and overestimating its own. When expectations were not met, as was bound to happen, disaffection with the interim government began to grow. There is still an enormous desire for change, because things remain bad for the vast majority of the population, but the hope that this change would be achieved through the interim government has faded.

    What kind of support should the international community provide to facilitate a democratic transition?

    What we would like to see from the international community is a multilateral, flexible and creative approach. The change of administration in the USA has been extremely important because the approach of the Trump administration was unilateral and overbearing. Fortunately, the Biden administration appears to adhere to a multilateral approach and to include Europe, Canada and other countries in our region.

    Regarding Europe, it was very important that the European Union sent an election observation mission for the 21 November elections, as it was for the UN and the Carter Center to send their election experts. The UN also has essential contributions to make in humanitarian and human rights matters, both in terms of mobilising resources to address the humanitarian emergency in the country and to support migrants and refugees across the region, as well as with regard to the human rights violations that continue to occur.

    The international community must listen to civil society and pay attention to the grievances of the people who are directly affected by the measures that external actors take in relation to Venezuela. Many of the sanctions that have been imposed on the government, such as the US secondary sanction that penalises the exchange of oil for diesel, end up not affecting the government, which has alternative courses of action, and instead harm users and consumers, ordinary people whose already complicated lives are complicated even further.

    If this part of Venezuelan society were listened to, it would be possible to think of alternative policies to generate spaces for negotiation and agreements that would allow us to return to the path of democracy and human rights in a non-violent manner.

    Civic space in Venezuela is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Acción Solidaria through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@AccionSolidaria and@fjreyna onTwitter.

     
  • VENEZUELA: ‘With the new NGO law, the government aims to take control of the entire associational fabric’

    RigobertoLoboPuentesCIVICUS speaks with Rigoberto Lobo Puentes, founder of Promotion, Education and Defence of Human Rights (Promoción, Educación y Defensa en Derechos Humanos, PROMEDEHUM), about Venezuela’s NGO bill which, if passed, will further hinder civil society’s work.

    PROMEDEHUM brings together people whose common goal is education about and the promotion and defence of human rights.

    How has civic space in Venezuela changed recently?

    Civic space has experienced tensions for more than a decade. In 2010 the government implemented the Law of National Sovereignty and Self-Determination to restrict access to funding by human rights organisations, citing alleged external threats against the Venezuelan government. This law was only the first step. Starting in 2016, when the ruling party lost control of the National Assembly, the government began to issue emergency decrees granting powers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to audit any agreement signed with international bodies by organisations or individuals to implement projects in Venezuela. This was part of a strategy to suffocate human rights organisations financially until they were forced to shut down.

    In 2020 the government body that regulates the banking system ordered banks to monitor the financial operations of civil society organisations (CSOs), supposedly to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. Following criticism from international human rights protection bodies, in 2021 the provisions of the National Office against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in relation to CSOs were slightly amended. However, they continue to violate international human rights standards. Among other things, they provided for the creation of a new body in charge of authorising the registration and operation of CSOs and obliged CSOs to provide sensitive information.

    This attack caused fissures in civil society, as many thought that since the focus was on human rights organisations, other CSOs, including humanitarian organisations, were out of harm’s way, even if they also in one way or another defended human rights. Many CSOs said they had no problem with the obligation to register. The situation was very confusing. It was never clear where the registry was or would be, and in each city, organisations were given different information.

    In 2021, the ruling party-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved a national legislative plan that included a Law on International Cooperation, which also established a mandatory registry for CSOs. The aim again was to limit access to funding for CSOs.

    In 2022, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force refuted the idea that all these regulations were needed. Its assessment of Venezuela concluded that there was no evidence the proposed or implemented CSO registries could prevent potential abuses linked to terrorism financing.

    Finally, in January 2024 the National Assembly approved in first reading of the draft Law on Control, Regularisation, Operations and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations, better known as the NGO law. If passed, this law will allow the government to further restrict the functioning of civil society, as it broadly prohibits ‘political activities’ without clearly defining what this refers to, and could result in the imposition of sanctions or the closure of CSOs deemed to be engaging in ‘political activities’. In the session where the bill was approved, more than 60 CSOs were singled out as enemies and traitors to the homeland.

    The continued threats to and vilification and persecution of CSOs and human rights defenders, and restrictions and attacks on media and journalists, raids on offices and jailing of humanitarian workers, have created a climate of great fear. Many CSOs have lost members, some have closed, and many human rights defenders have migrated for various reasons, including because they have been persecuted or fear persecution in the near future. Some organisations, including media outlets, have adopted self-censorship or changed the nature of their activities to prevent reprisals.

    What impacts would the NGO law have in this context?

    The NGO law seeks to limit citizen participation and human rights advocacy. It would turn the freedom of association into a matter of public order, exposing organisations to surveillance and police control. Organisations that fail to register or disclose their sources of funding could face fines, deregistration and criminal prosecution. They could be criminalised under charges of terrorism, money laundering, destabilisation, conspiracy and foreign interference.

    Although the draft law may appear to target only human rights organisations, its impacts will be much broader, as it aims to take control of the entire associational fabric. All organisational forms, including political parties and education and academic organisations, are potential targets. Victims of human rights violations could lose all legal support. People affected by Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency could lose access to civil society humanitarian programmes, which could be replaced by government programmes with restrictive access conditions.

    In short, the government seeks a tailor-made civil society. It has an interest in the continuity of humanitarian organisations, as they relieve it of a burden and help it maintain an image of openness with the international community. But it wants humanitarian organisations to play a purely welfare role, with no connection to human rights, and to refrain from publishing any information that might project a negative image of Venezuela.

    The government has already made progress in this area. To some extent it already controls the activities of humanitarian organisations and obtains constant information on their activities throughout Venezuela.

    Why has the NGO law been revived after it was put on hold last year?

    The government has moved forward with this law as prospects increase of an election in the near future. The law can be used not just against human rights CSOs. It can be used against any organisational form that is considered a space for critical thought or dissent. This particularly applies to CSOs working on civil and political rights issues, demanding electoral transparency, monitoring campaigns and observing elections.

    From the government’s perspective, civil society jeopardises its prospects of staying in power. Under fair electoral conditions, civil society’s monitoring, documentation and denunciation of human rights violations perpetrated by an already unpopular government could harm its electoral standing. For years the government has sought to subdue, suffocate or nullify CSOs, and this will intensify as it faces the need to ensure its continuity in power.

    The NGO law had been suspended but not forgotten. The government simply waited for the right time to resume its attacks. Recently, there have been accusations against and arrests of members of the military, political parties and journalists in connection with an alleged assassination plot that has been classed as terrorism. This is part of a situation created by the government to justify actions to neutralise those who might become obstacles in the face of an election. In this context, the possibility of the NGO law being passed should not be ruled out.

    How have civil society and the public reacted to these attacks?

    Despite the seriousness of the law, there is a lot of misinformation and a high level of ignorance among Venezuelan citizens. Even some CSOs are unaware of its existence or its importance.

    However, civil society has issued numerous criticisms. Between 2022 and 2024, national and international CSOs have published at least 15 statements and analyses of the NGO law and the law on international cooperation. Numerous forums, talks and awareness campaigns have been held, inside and outside Venezuela.

    Many organisations and human rights defenders have participated in interactive sessions at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and in side events at the UN, the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas, and have submitted reports to human rights bodies. As a result of this advocacy, between 2021 and 2023, 11 statements and reports about these laws were published by international bodies.

    Those of us outside Venezuela have also advocated with the governments of our host countries. In Argentina, where I am at the moment, politicians and civil society have publicly condemned the NGO law.

    The Venezuelan government doubled down and on 12 January launched a public consultation on the law, without making the official text of the draft law public or inviting human rights CSOs to participate. According to the information that has come to light, most of the participants in the consultation have been state officials, including police officers. From what we have been able to observe in consultation events, which take place relatively spontaneously in various places and without an established format, and in the discussions on the issue in the National Assembly, the prevailing discourse has delegitimised CSOs, which are referred to as enemies of the state.

    What guarantees does Venezuelan civil society need to keep doing its work?

    To continue our advocacy work in defence of civic space we need more international organisations and people to come on board to help report on the deteriorating situation. CSOs need access to more accurate and reliable information to help build alliances more quickly and effectively.

    Venezuelan CSOs continue to work to communicate any changes that occur and to raise the alarm when attacks on rights take place. We continue to advocate with other states, especially when there are changes of government that could affect international policies of states. One imminent risk is of the non-renewal of the mandate of the International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2019. This would be a serious blow to Venezuelan civil society.

    Venezuelan organisations should also evaluate and rethink strategies in terms of the impact of the information we produce. We should better showcase the strengths of the Venezuelan human rights movement. Perhaps proactive transparency, to the extent that it does not put organisations and their members at greater risk, could serve to influence both the international community and the public. It is crucial that people in Venezuela understand the dimensions of the losses that the deterioration of civic space and the extinction of CSOs pose to our country.

    Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with PROMEDEHUM through itswebsite orFacebook account, and follow it onInstagram and Twitter.

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